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The Admissibility of "Child Sexual
Abuse Accommodation Syndrome" in
California Criminal Courts
Children have been used for the sexual gratification of adults
throughout history.' Widespread public acknowledgment and concern
over this societal atrocity, however, is relatively new. Recent public
awareness has been accompanied by a dramatic increase in the number
of reported incidents of child sexual abuse.2
Children are protected from sexual abuse by criminal and civil
statutes in every state.3 The increase in reported incidents has resulted
in a surge of criminal and civil cases dealing with child sexual abuse.
The nature of child sexual abuse, however, makes criminal prosecu-
tion extremely difficult.4 A prosecutor often is faced with the frustra-
tion of proving a case with no corroborative evidence, no witnesses,
and a victim who is reluctant or unable to testify against the defen-
dant. 5 To combat these evidentiary problems, prosecutors have sought
to introduce expert testimony to establish that the child victim is suf-
fering from "child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome" (CSAAS).
Evidence concerning CSAAS has been introduced to prove that sex-
1. See L. DEMAUSE, THE HISTORY OF CHILDHOOD 43-51 (1974). "Growing up in [ancient]
Greece and Rome often included being used sexually by older men.... Boy brothels flourished
in every city. . . ." Id. at 43. "Intercourse with castrated children was often spoken of as
being especially arousing, castrated boys were favorite 'voluptates' in imperial Rome, and in-
fants were castrated 'in the cradle' to be used in brothels by men who liked buggering young
castrated boys." Id. at 46. "Even [with] the Jews, . . . the penalty for sodomy with children
over nine years of age was death by stoning, but copulation with younger children was not
considered a sexual act, and was punishable only by a whipping, 'as a matter of public
discipline."' Id. at 45 (citations ommitted).
2. T. DRABEC, PROSECUTION OF CHILD SExUAL ABUSE: THE SECONDARY TRAUMA OF THE
COURT 2 (1985).
3. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY
AND PROTECTION, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: LEOAL ISSUES AND APPROACHES 1 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Legal Issues and Approaches]. California has enacted several statutes to protect children
from sexual abuse. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §261.5 (crime for person to commit sexual
intercourse with female under 18 years of age); CAL. PENAL CODE §285 (crime for person to
commit incest); CAL. PENAL CODE §288 (crime for person to commit lewd or lascivious acts
with a child under the age of 14); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §300 (child whose home is an
unfit place by reason of neglect, cruelty, depravity, or physical abuse may be adjudged to
be a dependent child of the court).
4. Comment, The Sexually Abused Infant Hearsay Exception: A Constitutional Analysis,
8 J. Juv. L. 59, 59 (1984).
5. Comment, Evidentiary Problems in Criminal Child Abuse Prosecution, 63 GEO. L.J.
257, 259 (1974).
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ual abuse has occurred 6 and to bolster the victim's credibility.' CSAAS
includes five categories which represent the similar psychological symp-
toms displayed by sexually abused children.' The categories are: 1)
secrecy; 2) helplessness; 3) entrapment and accommodation; 4) delayed,
unconvincing disclosure; and 5) retraction.9
One of the first California cases to address the admissibility of
CSAAS involved a 1984 juvenile dependency hearing.' 0 The court in
In re Cheryl H." allowed a psychiatrist to testify that the victim's
conduct was typical of conduct exhibited by other young children who
had been sexually abused and that, in her opinion, the child had been
sexually molested.' 2 At a dependency hearing a determination that
a minor is a dependent child of the court must be established by proof
that would be admissible in civil trials.' 3 Rulings on the admissibility
of evidence must comply with the rules prescribed by the California
Evidence Code." Accordingly, the court in Cheryl H. found expert
opinion testimony that a child victim was sexually abused was a proper
subject for expert testimony under California Evidence Code section
801.1
In a criminal case the following year, however, the court did not
adhere to the holding in Cheryl H. The court in People v. Roscoe'6
held inadmissible a clinical psychologist's testimony that a fifteen-
year-old boy was the victim of child molestation." In a footnote,
the court added that less strict rules of admissibility apply in non-
criminal cases and cited Cheryl H. as an example.' 8
6. See, e.g., People v. Payan, 173 Cal. App. 3d 27, 32, 220 Cal. Rptr. 126, 128 (1985),
modified, 174 Cal. App. 3d 73b (1985); In re Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 1110, 200
Cal. Rptr. 789, 795 (1984); State v. Kim, 645 P.2d 1330, 1333-34 (Hawaii 1982).
7. See, e.g., Payan, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 33, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 128; Cheryl H., 153 Cal.
App. 3d at 1109-10, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 795; Smith v. State, 688 P.2d 326, 327 (Nev. 1984).
8. See Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 INT'L J. OF CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 177 (1983).
9. Id. at 181.
10. A juvenile dependency hearing is held pursuant to WELF. & INST. CODE section 300.
This section provides that under certain conditions, such as an unfit home, the juvenile court
may adjudge the child to be a dependent of the court. WELF. & INST. CODE §300. Although
the court in Cheryl H. did not mention the term "CSAAS" or even "syndrome," the expert
testimony described characteristics of abused children that were identical to the elements in
CSAAS. See Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d at 1109-10, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
11. 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1984).
12. Id. at 1109-10, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
13. CA. WELF. & INST. CODE §355. See In re Amanda 1., 166 Cal. App. 3d 248, 259,
212 Cal. Rptr. 317, 325 (1985).
14. CA. WELF. & INST. CODE §355.
15. CAL. EVID. CODE section 801 sets forth the standards for the admissibility of expert
opinion testimony. See infra note 118 and accompanying text (Section 801 stated in full).
16. 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1985).
17. Id. at 1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
18. Id. at 1100 n.4, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 50 n.4.
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The court, however, in the most recent California criminal case
to address the admissibility of CSAAS, People v. Payan,'9 allowed
testimony concerning CSAAS to be admitted. The expert's testimony
served both to bolster the credibility of the three victims and to
diagnose the children as victims of sexual molestation.20 Although the
court admitted evidence regarding CSAAS for both credibility and
diagnostic purposes under the factual circumstances of the particular
case, the ultimate holding limited the admissibility of CSAAS to
credibility purposes only. 2' The court added that the holding did not
imply that CSAAS was necessarily always admissible in child sexual
abuse prosecutions. 22 Instead of clarifying what circumstances war-
rant admission of CSAAS, the court provided trial courts with very
few guidelines by which to determine whether to admit or exclude
evidence concerning CSAAS.23
This comment contends that CSAAS is properly admissible in
criminal cases to bolster a victim's credibility and to establish that
a child has been sexually abused. To explain why testimony concern-
ing CSAAS is often essential, the evidentiary problems in child sex-
ual abuse cases will be discussed. 2" Before expert testimony on CSAAS
can be introduced into evidence, the testimony must first meet the
requisite standards for admissibility. 2s Thus, statutes and case law that
specify standards of admissibility for expert opinion testimony will
be analyzed.26 Next, CSAAS will be compared to analogous expert
testimony previously allowed in California criminal courts. 27 Finally,
relevant case law on CSAAS will be reviewed. 28 This comment will
conclude that case law should be interpreted to support the argument
for the admissibility of CSAAS in California criminal courts. 29 An
19. 173 Cal. App. 3d 27, 220 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1985), modified, 174 Cal. App. 3d 73b.
20. Id. at 33-34, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
21. The court stated,
We do hold that, as presented in the instant case, the subject of sexual abuse in
children, especially children of the age herein, is a proper subject for expert testimony
to aid the jury's understanding of factors which influence a child's behavior as well
as in explaining the significance of particular medical findings or lack thereof.
Id. at 40, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
22. Id.
23. See infra notes 251-270 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 81-110 and accompanying text.
25. Expert testimony on CSAAS must meet the prerequisite standards for both expert
testimony and scientific evidence, and the testimony cannot create a substantial danger of un-
due prejudice. See infra notes 115-117 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 115-167 and accompanying text.
27. 'See infra notes 171-204 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 205-270 and accompanying text.
29. Id.
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evaluation of whether CSAAS is admissible requires an understan-
ding of what symptoms the syndrome encompasses.
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE ACCOMMODATION SYNDROME
Child sexual abuse can occur in two distinct types of cases. The
first type of case involves child rape during which the victim is violently
attacked by a stranger.3" The child usually receives some form of
physical injury, and occasionally the child is murdered.3' While not
rare, these brutal attacks comprise only a small percentage of child
sexual assaults.32 The second type of case involves repeated sexual
abuse by a family member or an adult with whom the child has a
trusting relationship. 3  CSAAS describes the behavior of victims in
the latter situation. 34
A clinical study by Dr. Roland C. Summit of large numbers of
sexually abused children and their parents3" revealed a typical behavior
pattern or "syndrome"" among the victims. 37 Commentators and
courts have given these common psychological symptoms various
labels.3 This comment will use the phrase "child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome" (CSAAS).
30. Wells, Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome; Expert Testimony: To Admit or Not to Admit,
57 FLA. B. J. 672, 673 (1983).
31. Id. See, e.g., People v. Frank, 38 Cal. 3d 711, 700 P.2d 415, 214 Cal. Rptr. 801
(1985) (child victim brutally sexually molested and then murdered).
32. Wells, supra note 30, at 673. An intensive three year study of child sexual abuse in
New York City revealed that the offender was a total stranger in less than 23 percent of the
cases studied. The remainder of the cases involved a relative, neighbor, friend, or person in
the community with whom the child had frequent contact. DeFrancis, Protecting the Child
Victim of Sex Crimes Committed by Adults, 35 FED. PROB. 15, 17 (Sept. 1971).
33. Wells, supra note 30, at 673. See, e.g., In the Matter of Mary P., 701 P.2d 681,
682 (Kan. 1985) (two young children sexually molested by babysitter); State v. A.D.M., 701
P.2d 999, 999 (Mont. 1985) (five year old girl sexually abused by father); Smith, 688 P.2d
at 326 (young girl sexually assaulted by the man with whom her mother was living); People
v. Reid, 475 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Supp. 1984) (girl sexually abused by neighbor).
34. See Wells, supra note 30, at 674.
35. Dr. Summit does not indicate the exact number of children studied. He does indicate,
however, that clinical studies of "large numbers of children and their parents in proven cases
of sexual abuse" were conducted and that the validity of the syndrome was tested over a four
year period. See Summit, supra note 8, at 179-80. The syndrome was derived from the "collec-
tive experience of dozens of sexual abuse treatment centers in dealing with thousands of reports
or complaints of adult victimization of young children." Id. at 190.
36. A "syndrome" is formally defined as a group of symptoms or signs typical of a disease,
disturbance, or condition. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2320 (1976).
37. See Summit, supra note 8, at 177.
38. See, e.g., Payan, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 32, 40, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 128, 133 ("child
sexual abuse accommodation syndrome," "child abuse accommodation syndrome," and "child
sexual assault syndrome" were all used by the court); Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d at 1098, 215
Cal. Rptr. at 49 ("child molest syndrome"); Bussey v. Commonwealth, 697 S.W.2d 139, 139
(Ky. 1985) ("child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome"); State v. Carlson, 360 N.W.2d
442, 442 (Minn. 1985) ("child sexual abuse syndrome"); In the Matter of Michael G., 492
1364
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CSAAS is comprised of one or more of five elements. 39 The first
two elements are not caused by sexual abuse.4" Instead, the elements
are inherent in the adult-child relationship"' and are preconditions to
the sexual abuse.4" The first element is secrecy. A child who is molested
by a trusted adult often is faced with intimidation to keep the molesta-
tion a secret.13 The threat may range from a simple order not to tell
anybody" to a threat of death if the sexual abuse is revealed. 5 This
atmosphere of secrecy conveys to the child the understanding that
the molestation is bad and dangerous, and the child is reluctant to
expose the abuse. 6
The second element of CSAAS is helplessness. 7 A child is intrin-
sically powerless.' Children learn at a very early age that adults are
authority figures who must be obeyed.49 When faced with the sexual
advances of a parental figure or a trusted adult, a child often fears
punishment or loss of the adult's approval if sexual demands are not
met with acquiescence. 51 Child victims often respond to a sexual con-
frontation in a different manner than an adult.5 Instead of resistance,
a child often reacts with submission. 2 Young children are victimized
N.Y.S.2d 993, 995 (Fain. Ct. 1985) ("intrafamilial child sex abuse syndrome"); National Legal
Resource Center for Child Advocacy and Protection, Recommendations for Improving Legal
Intervention in Intrafamily Child Sexual Abuse Cases 40 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Recom-
mendations] ("sexually abused child syndrome"); Summit, supra note 8, at 181 ("child sexual
abuse accommodation syndrome").
39. These elements are: 1) secrecy, 2) helplessness, 3) entrapment and accommodation, 4)
delayed disclosure, and 5) retraction. Summit, supra note 8, at 181.
40. Id. at 181.
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Payan, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 32, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 127 (defendant told four-
year-old girl not to tell her mother).
45. Summit, supra note 8, at 181. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 155 Cal. App. 3d 153, 174,
202 Cal. Rptr. 162, 173 (1984) (defendant warned eight-year-old child that if she told her mother
about the continuing sexual abuse, he would try to kill her); State v. Haseltine, 352 N.W.2d
673, 675 (Wis. App. 1984) (defendant threatened sixteen-year-old daughter with death if she
told anyone that he had been sexually abusing her).
46. Summit, supra note 8, at 181.
47. Id. at 182.
48. Id.
49. Burgess and Holmstrom, Accessory-to-Sex: Pressure, Sex, and Secrecy, in SEXUAL
ASSAULT OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 86 (Burgess, Groth, Holmstrom, Sgroi eds. 1978).
50. Id. at 86-87. One six-year-old girl acquiesced for six years to the sexual demands of
her mother's thirty-year-old boyfriend, who told her, "Good girls do what their Daddy tells
them to." Id. at 87.
51. One victim writes of the sexual abuse received from her father: "Total detachment
became my way of dealing with what went on at night. I would roll into the wall when he
came in, pretending to be asleep, trying to be part of the wall." FORTrUNE, SEXUAL VIOLENCE:
THE UNMENTIONABLE SIN 163 (1983) (quoting from B. Myers, Developmental Disruptions of
Victims of Incest and Childhood Abuse, Mimeographed paper, 5 (1978)).
52. Summit, supra note 8, at 183.
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more easily than older children because they are less likely to under-
stand that they are being sexually abused. 3 In addition, very young
children may not have the ability to communicate the abuse to others
effectively.5 '
The three remaining elements of CSAAS occur as a direct result
of the sexual abuse." The third element, entrapment and accommoda-
tion, occurs after the child fails to seek immediate protection from
continued abuse. 6 Instead, the child learns to adjust to the traumatic
situation.57 This accommodation can include the development of multi-
ple personalities, altered states of consciousness, self-mutilation, suicidal
behavior, promiscuous sexual activity, repeated runaways, aggressive
and antisocial behavior, substance abuse, delinquency, depression, 8
sexual knowledge unusual in a child of the victim's age, atypical and
sexually explicit play behavior, and guilt.5 9 A child's outward manifesta-
tions of sexual abuse are relied upon heavily by professionals in deter-
mining whether the child has been sexually abused.6
The fourth element of CSAAS is delayed disclosure.6' Many cases
of sexual abuse are never reported,62 and the reports that are made
rarely occur immediately after an incident of abuse. 63 This delay does
not fit societal notions of typical victim behavior. 6" Moreover, the
53. See, Comment, supra note 4, at 59.
54. Id.
55. Summit, supra note 8, at 181.
56. Id. at 184.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 185.
59. J. Myers, Legal Response to Child Abuse: In the Best Interest of Children? 24 J.
F.m. L. 146, - (1985).
60. See, e.g., Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d at 1109-10, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 795 (conduct
of three year old victim included placing male doll on top of female doll, placing the penis
of the male doll in her mouth and "glassy-eyed, staring ahead compulsively" sucking on the
penis, going into a dissociated state or hiding her face whenever the subject of possible molestation
was broached, inventing new names for genitalia).
61. Summit, supra note 8, at 186.
62. Id. at 186. See CHILD ABusE: GOVERNING LAw & LEGISLATIION 106 (1. Sloan cd. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as LAW AND LEGISLATION]; Finkelhor, How Widespread is Child Sexual Abuse,
in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HuiAN SERWzcEs PuB. No. 30338, PERsPECTIVES ON CHILD
MALTREATMENT IN THE MID '80S, at 18 (1984). Many cases of child sexual abuse are never
reported due to the secrecy that surrounds the assault. See supra notes 46-49 and accompany-
ing text.
63. Summit, supra note 8, at 186. See, e.g., Mary P., 701 P.2d at 682 (two young children
who were molested by babysitter reported the assault five to eight months later); Reid, 475
N.Y.S.2d at 741 (girl who was sexually assaulted by neighbor waited two months before repor-
ting the abuse); Kim, 645 P.2d at 1330 (child who was sexually assaulted by step-father waited
a week before reporting the incident). See also, Matter of Tara H., 494 N.Y.S.2d 953, 955
(Fam. Ct. 1985) (sexual abuse not discovered until five-year-old child diagnosed as having in-
fectious gonorrhea).
64. See Summit, supra note 8, at 186.
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unexplained delay in disclosure often is used to attack the victim's
credibility.65
After a child has reported the abuse, the fifth element, retraction,
is common." The events following disclosure often are more traumatic
for the child than the abuse. 67 If the abuser is a family member, the
child is often removed from the household. 68 The rest of the family
sometimes accuses the child of lying and blames the child for break-
ing up the family unit.6 9 The child is put in the position of either
maintaining the accusation of abuse and destroying the family or
recanting the accusation to keep the household intact.70 Retraction
is the usual choice. 7'
CSAAS describes and explains the most typical reactions of child
sexual abuse victims.72 These reactions do not conform to the typical
adult expectations of how a child should react. 7 Dr. Summit found
that the behavior pattern adopted out of necessity by a sexually abused
child also tends to prevent society from believing the child if the abuse
is reported." CSAAS was developed to provide an explanation for
the victims' seemingly peculiar behavior and to help diagnose and
treat these victims. 75 In addition, Dr. Summit expressed the hope that
increased awareness of CSAAS would lead to greater support for child
victims of sexual abuse within the criminal justice system.76 The ad-
mission of expert testimony concerning CSAAS would help challenge
established myths and stereotypes surrounding child victims of sexual
abuse.77 Expert testimony explaining the peculiar behavior of a child
65. Id.
66. Id. at 188. See, e.g., State v. Middleton, 657 P.2d 1215, 1216 (Or. 1983) (child who
was sexually assaulted by her father reported the attack but recanted the story before the trial).
67. Summit, supra note 8, at 186.
68. Id. See, e.g., A.D.M., 701 P.2d at 999 (child sexually abused by father was removed
from her home and placed in foster care); State v. Love, 350 N.W.2d 359, 360 (Minn. 1984)
(child sexually molested by father was separated from her family and put in foster home).
69. Summit, supra note 8, at 188.
70. Id. See, e.g., Love, 350 N.W.2d at 360 (victim who accused her father of sexually
molesting her later told her mother that her accusation was untrue, but the court found she made
the retraction because she did not want anyone to get hurt).
71. See Summit, supra note 8, at 188.
72. Id. at 180.
73. Id. at 177.
74. Id. at 179.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 179-80. Summit wrote,
The purpose of this paper [on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome] then
is to provide a vehicle for a more sensitive, more therapeutic response to legitimate
victims of child sexual abuse and to invite more active, more effective clinical advocacy
for the child within the family and within the systems of child protection and criminal
justice.
Id.
77. Summit stated, "Application of the syndrome tends to challenge entrenched myths
1367
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victim would increase the credibility of the child and would aid the
trier of fact in determining whether sexual abuse occurred.78 Evidence
of CSAAS would not only be helpful but also necessary, especially
in light of the difficulties of proof in child sexual abuse cases.
EVIDENTIARY PROBLEMS IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES
The phrase "child sexual abuse" covers a broad spectrum of acts
including fondling or manual play, oral copulation, sodomy, rape,
and incest.79 Although every state has laws against child sexual abuse,"0
the crime often lacks direct evidence.8" As a result, child sexual abuse
is one of the most difficult offenses to prove.82
The sexual offender is often a relative or a trusted adult with whom
the child spends time alone. 3 Eyewitnesses to the molestation are
therefore rare."4 In addition, sexual abuse is typically a nonviolent
crime." Children who are abused by a trusted adult usually are
manipulated psychologically86 and do not resist their abusers.1' Physical
injury can provide valuable medical evidence of the sexual abuse, but
this evidence often is lacking because the abuse is committed without
force.88 Furthermore, the sexual abuse may involve an act other than
penetration of the vagina or anus. 9 Crimes such as petting, fondling
and prejudice, providing credibility and advocacy for the child within the home, the courts,
and throughout the treatment process." Id. at 177.
78. Id.
79. DeFrancis, supra note 32, at 17; see also, LEGAL ISSUES AND APPROACHES, supra note
3, at 1.
80. LEGAL ISSUES AND APPROACHES, supra note 3, at 1.
81. Comment, supra note 5, at 259; Comment, A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay
Statements in Sex Abuse Cases, 83 COLUM. L. RaV. 1745, 1745 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, A Comprehensive Approach].
82. See Comment, supra note 5, at 259-60. See also Comment, supra note 4, at 59.
83. Comment, A Comprehensive Approach, supra note 81, at 1750.
84. DeFrancis, supra note 32, at 17; Comment, supra note 4, at 59-60. See, e.g., Kim,
645 P.2d at 1330 (thirteen-year-old complainant sexually assaulted by stepfather was the only
witness to the attack). Eyewitnesses to sexual attacks on adults, as well as children, are usually
nonexistent. See Comment, Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome: Admissibility and
Effective Use in Criminal Rape Prosecution, 33 AM. UNIV. L. Rav. 417, 422 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Expert Testimony on RTS].
85. Comment, A Comprehensive Approach, supra note 81, at 1745.
86. Berliner, Blick, & Bulkley, Expert Testimony on the Dynamics of Intra-Family Child
Sexual Abuse and Principles of Child Development, in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAW
171 (1981). The child often will succumb due to the strong desire to not displease the adult,
whom the child likes and trusts, even though the child may find the requested sexual act unplea-
sant. DeFrancis, supra note 32, at 18. In addition, the adult's position of authority carries
a subtle threat that the child will be punished for refusing to participate in the sexual activity. Id.
87. Comment, A Comprehensive Approach, supra note 81, at 1750.
88. Berliner, Blick, & Bulkley, supra note 86, at 171.
89. See, e.g., People v. Dunnahoo, 152 Cal. App. 3d 561, 567, 199 Cal. Rptr. 796, 798
1368
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or oral copulation usually do not involve forceful physical contact
and do not leave physical scars.9" A lapse of time between the sexual
abuse and disclosure may also contribute to the lack of medical
evidence. 9' Many cases of abuse occur repeatedly over a period of
years.92 Often, by the time the abuse is reported or discovered, any
trace of physical evidence has disappeared.93
The absence of direct evidence often forces the prosecutor to rely
primarily upon the child's testimony as evidence. 94 To testify, a child
must first be found competent by the court." Cases in which young
victims are held incompetent because of their inability to communicate
effectively must be dismissed unless additional evidence of the crime
exists.96 Even if the child is found competent, the legal process often
is so traumatic and embarrassing that the child is inhibited from
testifying. 97 At times the child simply refuses to testify. 98
Child victims mature enough to take the witness stand often are
subjected to cross-examinations that confuse or intimidate them.
Children may be impeached more easily than adults, 99 and the defense
(1984) (defendant directed two five-year-old girls to masturbate each other and forced them
to engage in oral copulation of his penis to ejaculation); Matter of S.L.T., 697 P.2d 472,
473 (Mont. 1985) (father molested fifteen-year-old daughter by fondling her breasts and rubbing
the inside of her thighs); Hall v. State, 692 S.W.2d 769, 770 (1985) (defendant held two young
girls on his lap while he rubbed between their legs and made them touch his penis). Actual
penetration of the vagina or anus often leaves valuable evidence of the abuse. See, e.g., In
the Matter of Michael G., 492 N.Y.S.2d 993, 994 (Fain. Ct. 1985) (anus of 3 year old victim
looked like "a piece of raw meat"); Hancock v. State, 706 P.2d 1164, 1172 (Alaska App.
1985) (defendant penetrated vagina of child victim with an object that became implanted and
required surgery for removal); State v. Love, 350 N.W.2d at 360-61 (hymen of ll-year-old
victim was not intact, and vaginal opening was larger than normal for a child of victim's age).
90. Comment, A Comprehensive Approach, supra note 81, at 1750.
91. See Berliner, Blick, & Bulkley, supra note 86, at 171.
92. LEGAL ISSUES AND APPROACHES, supra note 3, at 3. See, e.g., Haseltine, 352 N.W.2d
673 (defendant repeatedly had sexual intercourse with his daughter over a two year period).
93. LEGAL ISSUES AND APPROACHES, supra note 3, at 16.
94. Comment, Defendants' Rights in Child Witness Competency Hearings, 69 MINN. L.
REv. 1377, 1377 (1985). Relying solely on a child's testimony may be fatal to the prosecutor's
case because children generally produce unreliable evidence. Note, Parent-Child Incest: Proof
at Trial Without Testimony in Court by the Victim, 15 J. L. REFORM 131, 137 (1981). Children
have a subjective sense of time, an inaccurate memory, and a limited ability to communicate,
all of which tend to get worse when the child is placed under pressure. Id. See, e.g., State
v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 607 (Minn. 1984) (child victim could not conceptualize the dif-
ference between sexual penetration and contact).
95. The court has discretion to determine whether a child is capable of accurately observ-
ing and communicating past events. LEGAL ISSUES AND APPROACHES, supra note 3, at 15. A
child must also be able to understand the necessity of telling the truth. Id. at 15. See CAL.
EVID. CODE §710 (requirement that every testifying witness take oath).
96. See Comment, supra note 94, at 1380.
97. Berliner, Blick, & Bulkley, supra note 86, at 166.
98. Prager, "Sexual Psychopathy" and Child Molesters: The Experiment Fails, 6 J. Juv.
L. 49, 72 (1972).
99. Comment, Liberalization in the Admissibility of Evidence in Child Abuse and Child
1369
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attorney often is successful in bringing out discrepancies and con-
tradictions in the testimony of the child.'00 In addition, the child's
testimony will be compared to the testimony of the accused.' 0 ' If the
offender has a good reputation in the community, juries are more
likely to believe the adult than the child, especially if little corroborating
evidence is available.10 2
In addition to the lack of direct evidence, the prosecutor is faced
with pervasive myths about child sexual abuse.'0 3 Society has many
preconceived ideas about how a victim should look and act.'0 4 If a
child victim fails to meet these expectations, the child's report of sex-
ual abuse often is discredited.' 5 For example, the child's report of
abuse may be discredited due to a failure to resist the abuse, 06 the
lack of physical injury, 07 the delay in reporting the assault, 08 a
retracted accusation, ' or behavior that does not reflect the trauma
expected of a sexually abused child." 0
The attorney representing the accused usually will try to undermine
the child victim's credibility by focusing upon contradictory responses
to the sexual abuse." ' To rebut this attack on the victim's credibility"
2
and to prove that sexual abuse actually occurred,'' prosecutors recently
Molestation Cases, 7 J. Juv. L. 205, 210 (1983).
100. See DeFrancis, supra note 32, at 16. See also, People v. Jones, 155 Cal. App. 3d
153, 167, 202 Cal. Rptr. 162, 168 (1984). The court in Jones stated,
It is clear that [the victim] became easily confused and her testimony was contradic-
tory upon cross-examination. However, the witness was only 12 years old. She alleged
that she had been sexually involved with [defendant] since the age of six, and there
had been many instances of sexual intercourse. It would be surprising if a defense
attorney, skilled in the art of cross-examination . . . could not hopelessly confuse
an already traumatized 12-year-old child under these circumstances.
Id.
101. Berliner, Blick, & Bulkley, supra note 86, at 166.
102. Id. at 166; Summit, supra note 8, at 178.
103. Wells, supra note 30, at 673.
104. See Summit, supra note 8, at 177.
105. Wells, supra note 30, at 673.
106. See, e.g., People v. Blodgett, 176 Cal. App. 3d 108, 113-14, 221 Cal. Rptr. 704, 706
(1985) (eleven-year-old girl admitted that she "kind of" let defendant tie her to a bed with
socks before he sexually assaulted her, and that on four or five later occasions she also allowed
the defendant to tie her down).
107. See, e.g., Payan, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 32, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 128 (doctor found no
physical damage to the anuses of two child victims but said this finding was not inconsistent
with "slow and gentle" sodomy).
108. See, e.g., Reid, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 741 (child waited two months before reporting the
sexual assault by a neighbor).
109. See, e.g., Middleton, 657 P.2d at 1216 (child recanted story of sexual abuse by her
father before the trial).
110. Wells, supra note 30, at 673.
111. J. Myers, supra note 59, at _ .
112. See, e.g., Payan, 173 Cal. App. 3d 27, 220 Cal. Rptr. 126; Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App.
3d 1098, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789; Smith, 688 P.2d 326.
113. See, e.g., Payan, 173 Cal. App. 3d 27, 220 Cal. Rptr. 126; Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App.
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have tried to introduce evidence of CSAAS at trial."4I Expert testimony
on CSAAS helps to dispel myths surrounding child sexual abuse and
aids juries in understanding why child victims react to abuse in a
manner contrary to typical expectations of society.
PREREQuIsITEs To ADMISSIBILITY OF CSAAS
Before the prosecution can introduce expert testimony concerning
CSAAS as evidence in a criminal case, the testimony on the syndrome
must meet the standards of admissibility. The evidence must satisfy
the requirements for both expert testimony' 5 and scientific evidence.'6
In addition, the evidence cannot create a substantial danger of undue
prejudice against the defendant." 7
A. Expert Testimony
The governing standard for expert opinion testimony in California
is codified in Evidence Code section 801.118 Section 801 sets forth
several requirements for admissibility of an expert's opinion. First,
the subject of the testimony must be beyond common experience to
3d 1098, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789; Kin, 645 P.2d 1330.
114. Many cases have allowed experts to testify concerning the typical behavior of sexually
abused children. See, e.g., Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d at 1109-10, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 795;
Dunnahoo, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 577, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 804; Myers, 359 N.W.2d at 608-09;
Middleton, 657 P.2d at 1220-21; Kim, 647 P.2d at 1333-34. Relatively few cases have labelled
the evidence as CSAAS or any other form of syndrome. This comment views the lack of for-
mal label as a mere technicality and will treat evidence concerning an element of CSAAS as
evidence of CSAAS, regardless of the lack of formal terminology used by the court.
115. CAL. EvID. CODE §801.
116. See People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, (1976); Frye
v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See generally Comment, Expert Testimony
on RTS, supra note 84, at 429-56 (in-depth discussion on the parallel admissibility requirements
for rape trauma syndrome.).
117. CAL. EvID. CODE §352.
118. California Evidence Code section 801 provides:
If a witness is testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of an opinion is
limited to such an opinion as is:
(a) Related to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the
opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact; and
(b) Based on matter (including his special knowledge, skill, experience, training,
and education) perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known to
him at or before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a type that
reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject
to which his testimony relates, unless an expert is precluded by law from using such
matter as a basis for his opinion.
Id. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 similarly states that an expert may testify in the form of
an opinion if the testimony will "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue." Rule 702 is less stringent than Evidence Code section 801 because the
subject does not have to be "sufficiently beyond common experience." See, FED. R. EViD.
702; CAL. EVID. CODE § 801.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 17
the extent that the opinion would assist the trier of fact." 9 Second,
the expert must have sufficient knowledge, skill, or experience upon
which to base the opinion.120 Finally, the basis for the opinion must
be of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in
forming an opinion on the subject of the testimony.' 2 '
California courts have found that the subject of child sexual abuse
concerns knowledge sufficiently beyond common experience that the
opinion of an expert would be of assistance to the trier of fact. 2 '
Expert testimony regarding child sexual abuse, therefore, meets the
first requirement under Evidence Code section 801. The requirement
that an expert must have sufficient knowledge, skill, or experience
is not difficult to satisfy. The expert merely must be qualified in the
field of child sexual abuse.' 23
Unfortunately, courts have not clarified what is necessary to meet
the final requirement of a proper basis for opinion testimony con-
cerning CSAAS. 124 Only two California cases have addressed the issue
of what constitutes a proper basis for an expert opinion that a child
victim has been sexually abused.'25 The expert in the first case, Cheryl
H., based her opinion on the conduct of the child during play
therapy. 26 The court held that the information obtained by the expert
119. CAL. EVID. CODE §801(a).
120. Id. §801(b).
121. Id.
122. Dunnahoo, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 577, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 804 (testimony that a sexually
molested child had great difficulty talking about sexual indiscretions with an adult); Cheryl
H., 153 Cal. App. 3d at 1116, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 800 (testimony that the child victim had
been sexually abused). Berliner, Blick, & Bulkley, supra note 86, at 169. Most jurors do not
possess sufficient knowledge about the characteristics and dynamics of child sexual abuse,
especially when the abuse is within the family. Id.
123. See, e.g., Payan, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 34, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 128 (a licensed physician
who was a founding member and past director of the sexual assault response team, who par-
ticipated in formulating the protocol for rape and sexually abused victims at the University of
Southern California Women's Hospital, and who had attended seminars of long-term effects
of child abuse and molestation and the sexual abuse syndrome qualified as an expert); Roscoe,
168 Cal. App. 3d at 1095, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 46 (the expert was a clinical psychologist); Cheryl
H., 153 Cal. App. 3d at 1109, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 795 (the expert was a psychiatrist appointed by
the court); Myers, 359 N.W.2d at 607 (a clinical psychologist was allowed to testify as an
expert); Middleton, 657 P.2d at 1217-18 (a juvenile counselor for the county and a child pro-
tective social worker both qualified as experts). Under California Evidence Code section 405,
a judge must find more true than not true that a witness qualifies as an expert. See, CAL.
EVID. CODE §405. Once this standard is met, the question of credibility is left up to the jury,
and the opposing counsel is free to discredit the witness. Id.
124. See Comment-Law Revision Commission, CAL. Evro. CODE §801 (West 1966) (the nature
of the matter upon which an expert may base his opinion varies from case to case).
125. See Payan, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 32, 39, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 128, 133; Cheryl H., 153
Cal. App. 3d at 1117-18, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 800-01.
126. 153 Cal. App. 3d at 1110, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 795 (child victim played with male and
female dolls in a manner similar to other sexually abused children, and the child used words
and demonstrated anxiety symptoms characteristic of children who have been sexually abused).
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during therapy was a proper and sufficient basis for an opinion within
the meaning of California Evidence Code section 801.127 The second
case, Payan, involved an expert who based her opinion on a review
of police reports, medical reports, and the preliminary hearing
transcript.'28 The court held that the basis for the opinion was pro-
per. ' Instead of applying a rigid standard, the courts appear to use
a case by case analysis of whether the basis for the opinion is reliable
enough to meet the standard of section 801. Once the witness and
general subject matter meet the standards of admissibility for expert
testimony, the next hurdle is the admissibility of CSAAS.
B. Satisfying the Kelly-Frye Test
Evidence based upon a new scientific method of proof is admissi-
ble only upon a showing that the procedure generally has been ac-
cepted as reliable in the scientific community in which the method
was developed.' 30 This standard of admissibility is known in Califor-
nia as the Kelly-Frye rule.' 31 Difficulty arises, however, in analyzing
whether CSAAS meets the definition of a scientific method of proof.'
3 2
127. Id.
128. 173 Cal. App. 3d at 32, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
129. Id. at 39, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 132 (the court noted that an expert opinion may be based
on hearsay or the reports and opinions of other physicians).
130. People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 372, 690 P.2d 709, 723-24, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236,
250-51 (1984); People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144,
148 (1976); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
131. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 30, 549 P.2d at 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 148; Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
132. Courts that have admitted expert testimony on the elements of CSAAS without label-
ing the elements as part of a "syndrome" have not discussed the Kelly-Frye rule. See, e.g.,
Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d at 1109-10, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 795 (a psychiatrist testified that
the conduct exhibited by the victim was typical of conduct exhibited by other young children
who had been sexually abused, but the court did not address the Kelly-Frye standard); Dunnahoo,
152 Cal. App. 3d at 577, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 804 (two police officers testified that a sexually
molested child has difficulty talking to an adult about the sexual abuse, but no mention was
made of the Kelly-Frye standard). For examples of courts in other states admitting testimony
on sexual abuse without addressing the Kelly-Frye test, see Middleton, 657 P.2d at 1216 (expert
witness testified concerning the typical reaction of a child victim of familial sexual abuse and
whether the victim reacted in a typical manner when she later made inconsistent statements);
Myers, 359 N.W.2d at 608-09 (expert permitted to describe characterisics or traits typically
observed in sexually abused children and to identify those characteristics which the victim had
exhibited); Kim, 645 P.2d at 1333-34 (expert testified concerning the common emotional reac-
tions frequently found in victims and which of these reactions were experienced by the child
in the present case); Matter of S.L.T., 697 P.2d at 473-74 (court admitted a psychological
evaluation which indicated that the victim exhibited the characteristics of a sexually abused
child); State v. Pettit, 675 P.2d 183, 185 (Or. App. 1984) (expert testified concerning the general
characteristics of victims of sexual abuse). The only California case that has used the terminology
of a syndrome ("child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome") handled the issue of whether
the Kelly-Frye rule should apply by stating that the rule has never been applied to expert medical
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If CSAAS is not considered a scientific method of proof, then the
Kelly-Frye standard does not have to be satisfied for admissibility.' 33
If California courts eventually label CSAAS as a scientific method
of proof, CSAAS should be admissible under the Kelly-Frye test.
Courts have considered several factors in determining whether evidence
regarding a new scientific technique should be admitted or excluded.",
These factors include the number of articles written on the subject,' 35
the number of cases that have admitted testimony based on the new
theory,1 36 the amount of research conducted by others in the field, 37
and testimony by others in the field on whether the theory has gain-
ed general acceptance.' 38
CSAAS meets all of these factors for admissibility. First, although
CSAAS is a relatively new concept, ' the syndrome has been the topic
testimony. Payan, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 36, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 130. The court in Payan was
following the precedent that the California Supreme Court set in People v. McDonald. Id.
See McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 373, 690 P.2d at 724, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 251. The court in McDonald
stated, "We have never applied the Kelly-Frye rule to expert medical testimony, even when
the witness is a psychiatrist and the subject matter is as esoteric as the reconstitution of a
past state of mind or the prediction of future dangerousness." Id. The courts in McDonald
and Payan appear to have either overlooked or discounted the application of the Kelly-Frye
rule to expert psychiatric testimony concerning rape trauma syndrome. People v. Bledsoe, 36
Cal. 3d 236, 245-51, 681 P.2d 291, 297-301, 203 Cal.Rptr. 450, 456-60 (1984) (application of
Kelly-Frye rule to expert psychiatric testimony concerning RTS). Other state courts also have
analyzed rape trauma syndrome under the Frye test. See, e.g., State v. Marks, 647 P.2d 1292,
1299 (Kan. 1982); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 229-30 (Minn. 1982). People v. Shirley,
31 Cal. 3d 18, 53, 641 P.2d 775, 795, 181 Cal.Rptr. 243, 264 (1982). The California Supreme
Court addressed the question of whether the Frye standard was appropriate in determining
the admissibility of "hypnotically aided recall" by stating, "[W]e do not doubt that if testimony
based on a new scientific process operating on purely psychological evidence were to be offered
in our courts, it would likewise be subjected to the Frye standard of admissibility." Id. Courts
have appeared reluctant to address directly the issue of whether CSAAS is a method of scien-
tific proof. The determination of whether CSAAS is actually scientific evidence is beyond the
scope of this comment. The Kelly-Frye rule establishes a higher standard of admissibility for
scientific evidence than nonscientific evidence. This comment will address this higher standard.
If CSAAS is admissible under the Kelly-Frye test, then the syndrome is also admissible if
the test does not apply.
133. See, e.g., Payan, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 36, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 130 (court distinguished
expert medical testimony from the meaning of scientific evidence under the Kelly-Frye rule
and did not apply the Kelly-Frye rule to expert testimony regarding CSAAS); McDonald, 37
Cal. 3d at 372-73, 690 P.2d at 723-24, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 250-51 (court found that expert testimony
concerning eyewitness identification was not scientific evidence and thus held that the Kelly-
Frye rule did not apply).
134. See Comment, The Expert as Educator: A Proposed Approach to the Use of Battered
Woman Syndrome Expert Testimony, 35 VAND. L. REV. 741, 749 (1982).
135. See U.S. v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 441 (1970).
136. See U.S. v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 465-66 (1975).
137. See U.S. v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 557 (1977).
138. See Payan, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 33, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
139. S. Mele-Sernovitz, Parental Sexual Abuse of Children: The Law as a Therapeutic Tool
for Families, in LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE MALTREATED CHILD, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN (1979) (the first mention of CSAAS). Summit, supra note 8 (published
in 1983).
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of a number of articles.' 0 Second, many courts have admitted
testimony concerning the behavior of children who have been sexually
abused, even though this behavior was not formally labelled as a syn-
drome.' 4' Furthermore, the only California court to label the victim's
behavior as a syndrome admitted the testimony about CSAAS into
evidence.' Third, much research has been conducted on sexually abus-
ed children.' 3 Although the common characteristics of sexually abused
children are not usually labeled as a syndrome, they generally fit under
the elements of CSAAS. '4 Finally, although the issue of CSAAS has
been addressed as a syndrome in only one California case,' 45 the
psychiatrist in that case testified that the syndrome was a "widely
recognized and accepted medical diagnosis."' 4 6 These four factors
establish that CSAAS generally is accepted as reliable in the field of
child sexual abuse and meets the standard for admissibility under the
Kelly-Frye rule.""
C. Potential Danger of Undue Prejudice
Satisfying the Kelly-Frye standard, however, does not guarantee ad-
missibility. Testimony concerning CSAAS may be excluded if the pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by substantial danger of undue
prejudice.'4 " Courts must balance the reasons for exclusion against
140. See, e.g., Summit, supra note 8; S. Mele-Sernovitz, supra note 139; Kempe and Heifer,
BATrERED CHILD SYNDROME (1974); Berliner, Blick, & Bulkley, supra note 86; Recommenda-
tions, supra note 38, at 40-41; J. Myers, supra note 59.
141. See, e.g., Dunnahoo, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 577, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 804; Cheryl H.,
153 Cal. App. 3d at 1116, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 799-800; Kim, 645 P.2d at 1338; Myers, 359
N.W.2d at 609-10; Middleton, 657 P.2d at 1220-21.
142. See Payan, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 37-40, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 131-33.
143. See Legal Issues and Approaches, supra note 3; Summit, Recognition and Treatment
of Child Sexual Abuse, in PROVIDING FOR THE EMOTIONAL HEALTH OF PEDIATRIC PATIENT (C.
Hollingsworth, ed. 1983); Russell, The Incidence and Prevalence of Intrafamilial and Extrafamilial
Sexual Abuse of Female Children, in CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 133-46 (1983); Finkelhor, supra
note 62.
144. Berliner, Blick, & Bulkley, supra note 86, at 171-72 (lists characteristics that are iden-
tical to CSAAS: lack of force and physical injury, delayed disclosure, isolation from peers,
promiscuity, retraction, and inconsistent statements).
145. Payan, 173 Cal. App. 3d 27, 220 Cal. Rptr. 126.
146. Id., at 33, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 128. Dr. Summit stated that "the syndrome has elicited
strong endorsements from experienced professionals and from victims, offenders, and other
family members." See Summit, supra note 8, at 180.
147. The lack of scientific certainty does not deprive the medical opinion of evidentiary
value. People v. Jackson 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 507, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919, 921 (1971).
148. CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE CODE section 352 provides in pertinent part: "The court in its
discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the pro-
bability that its admission will. .. (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice. ...."
The court in Payan noted that the defense counsel made no objection on grounds of Evidence
Code section 352, and the court did not address a section 352 argument. Payan, 173 Cal.
App. 3d at 32 n.3, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 127 n.3. The court in Roscoe acknowledged that the
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the reasons for admission.""' Opponents of expert testimony concern-
ing CSAAS will argue that jurors will be so impressed with the
witness' aura of expertise they will merely adopt the expert's opin-
ion without independent judgment.' 5 0 The fact-finding function of the
jury would be undermined if jurors accepted the expert's opinion as
the truth without questioning the validity of the testimony."'
The proper use of expert testimony on CSAAS, however, need not
invade the province of the jury. The purpose of expert testimony con-
cerning a victim's credibility' is not to substitute the expert's opin-
ion regarding credibility for that of the jury.'3 Instead, this testimony
provides a scientific perspective with which the jury can independent-
ly evaluate the victim's testimony and behavior.1 4 Opposing counsel
can attempt to discredit the expert testimony through cross-examination
and can attempt to show possible bias of the expert.'" The defense
also is free to call an expert to counterbalance any aura of expertise
the prosecution might have created. " 6
In addition, expert testimony on CSAAS is not overly prejudicial
to the defendant merely because the testimony coincides with issues
to be decided by the trier of fact.' Both the California Evidence
Code and the Federal Rules of Evidence have abandoned the "ultimate
issue" rule, which prohibits opinion testimony from embracing an
defense counsel did not refer specifically to section 352 as a basis for objection. Roscoe, 168
Cal. App. 3d at 1100 n.5, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 50 n.5. The court excluded testimony, however,
about RTS by motion of the court under this section. Id., at 1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
The court stated that no obligation exists for a court to reject testimony on its own motion
if the defense fails to object under section 352, but this failure to object should not be con-
trolling. Id. at 1100 n.5, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 50 n.5.
149. See, CAL. EVID. CODE §352. See People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d i, 25, 609 P.2d 468,
482, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 15 (court held that in a case involving a section 352 motion, the record
must affirmatively show that the trial judge did in fact weigh prejudice against probative value).
150. Doyle, Applying Lawyers' Expertise to Scientific Experts, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV.
619, 621 (1984).
151. CAL. PENAL CODE §1126 (provides that questions of fact are to be decided by the jury).
152. Expert testimony on CSAAS has been used to bolster the victim's credibility by help-
ing the jury or court to understand the victim's unnatural behavior. See, e.g., Middleton, 657
P.2d at 1220-21.
153. Kim, 645 P.2d at 1332.
154. Id.
155. Middleton, 657 P.2d at 1221.
156. While a battle of the experts might result, a potential battle exists whenever an expert
is called in any type of case. See generally L. Myers, The Battle of the Experts: A New Ap-
proach to an Old Problem in Medical Testimony, 44 NEB. L. REV. 539 (1965).
157. CALIFORNA EVIDENCE CODE section 805 provides: "Testimony in the form of an opi-
nion that is otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces the ultimate issue
to be decided by the trier of fact." Since the trier of fact is free to evaluate and either accept
or reject the opinion of the witness, opinion evidence on the ultimate issue does not invade
the province of the jury. See McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 371, 690 P.2d at 722, 208 Cal. Rptr.
at 249; People v. Cole, 47 Cal. 2d 99, 105, 301 P.2d 854, 857-58 (1956). See also FED. RULE
OF EvID. 704.
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ultimate issue.' Thus, although expert testimony that bolsters the
victim's credibility or evidences that the child had been sexually abused
encompasses ultimate issues, the testimony is still properly admissi-
ble.' 59 Proper jury instructions may be given to reduce the weight
given to expert opinion testimony'60 and to remind jurors they are
the ultimate triers of fact.' 6 '
While expert testimony concerning CSAAS may create a danger
of prejudice to the defendant, the danger is counterbalanced by the
serious need for CSAAS in child sexual abuse cases.' The probative
value of CSAAS is extremely high.' 63 The nature of child sexual abuse
compounds the evidentiary difficulty already present because of the
requirement of proving criminal cases beyond a reasonable doubt. 64
The use of CSAAS in criminal cases will help to destroy jurors'
misconceptions about child sexual abuse and will increase the accuracy
of the fact-finding process. 5 California courts have held that if
evidence relates to a critical issue, directly supports an inference rele-
vant to that issue, and other evidence does not support the same in-
ference as directly, the testimony must be received absent highly
unusual circumstances.' 66 In addition, a court outside California has
held that when the common experience of the jury may represent a
less than adequate foundation for evaluating a witness' credibility,
the expert's testimony has greater value and is more likely to be ad-
missible when the probative value of the testimony is weighed against
the prejudicial effects. 6 7 Any danger of undue prejudice to the defen-
158. See supra note 157.
159. If the substantive law compels the fact finder to assess how people think and behave
in certain situations and psychology can offer information about that thought and
behavior, it seems unreasonable to exclude expert evidence that might help the fact
finder, forcing untrained jurors to draw conclusions based on untested hunches and
intuition.
Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and
Its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REV. 395, 445 (1985).
160. CALJIC No. 2.80 (4th ed. 1979). "You are not bound to accept an expert opinion
as conclusive, but should give to it the weight to which you find it to be entitled. You may
disregard any such opinion if you find it to be unreasonable." Id.
161. See Doyle, supra note 150, at 639. The court in Payan admitted evidence of CSAAS
and instructed the jury that they ultimately must determine whether the assumed facts were
supported by the evidence. Payan, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 33, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
162. See supra notes 81-110 and accompanying text (discussion of evidentiary problems in
child sexual abuse cases).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See Summit, supra note 8, at 177.
166. In re Marianne R., 113 Cal. App. 3d 423, 428, 169 Cal. Rptr. 848, 850 (1980); Kessler
v. Gray, 77 Cal. App. 3d 248, 292, 143 Cal. Rptr. 496, 500 (1978). The evidence must be
admitted despite a section 352 objection. Id.
167. Kim, 645 P.2d at 1337 (Hawaii 1982).
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dant does not substantially outweigh the tremendous probative value
of testimony concerning CSAAS.' 68 Evidence concerning CSAAS,
therefore, meets the final standard for admissibility and should be
accepted by California criminal courts. California courts already have
determined that expert testimony concerning comparable syndromes
has met the prerequisite standards for admissibility in criminal cases.
OTHER SYNDROMES ADMISSIBLE IN CALIFORNIA
Several syndromes have been recognized as admissible evidence by
criminal courts in the United States.'69 California criminal courts have
accepted two syndromes that are closely related to CSAAS as reliable
evidence.7 0 These two syndromes are the "battered child syndrome"' 7 ,
(BCS) and "rape trauma syndrome"' 72 (RTS).
California courts allow expert opinion testimony concerning BCS
to establish that the facial and bodily injuries exhibited by a child
are the result of an ongoing pattern of child beating rather than in-
nocent accidents."' The description of BCS includes a child who is
usually under three years of age, evidence of bone injuries occurring
at different times, subdural hematomas with or without skull frac-
tures, serious injuries without a plausible explanation, the presence
of soft tissue injury, and evidence of neglect by the child's caretaker.'"
The admissibility of BCS in California criminal cases was established
in People v. Jackson.'" The court in Jackson found that BCS was
an accepted medical diagnosis' 6 and that a doctor's diagnosis that
a child was suffering from BCS was not an improper invasion of
168. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (California Evidence Code section 352 stated
in pertenant part).
169. See, e.g., Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C.App. 1979) ("battered wife"
syndrome); State v. Marks, 647 P.2d 1292 (Kan. 1982) (rape trauma syndrome); State v. Loss,
204 N.W.2d 404 (Minn. 1973) (battered child syndrome).
170. See, e.g., Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (rape trauma syndrome);
Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (rape trauma syndrome); People
v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1971) (battered child syndrome).
171. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919.
172. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45.
173. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d at 507, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 921.
174. Id. at 506, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 921.
175. 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919. California decisions after Jackson also have
approved the use of BCS. See People v. Phillips, 122 Cal. App. 3d 69, 87, 175 Cal. Rptr.
703, 714 (1981); People v. Ewing, 72 Cal. App. 3d 714, 717, 140 Cal. Rptr. 299, 301 (1977).
Courts in other states have admitted evidence of BCS. See, e.g., State v. Loss, 204 N.W.2d
404, 408-09 (Minn. 1973); People v. Henson, 304 N.E.2d 358, 363-64 (N.Y. 1973); State v.
Wilkerson, 247 S.E.2d 905, 912 (N.C. 1978); State v. Best, 232 N.W.2d 447, 458 (S.D. 1975).
176. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d at 507, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 921.
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the province of the jury. "7 California courts have determined that
evidence of BCS is not unduly prejudicial to the defendant. " 8 No
undue prejudice exists because the syndrome merely classifies the child's
injuries as nonaccidental without directly identifying who caused the
injuries. '79
Although the psychological and emotional damage under CSAAS
is different from the physical injuries characteristic of BCS, both syn-
dromes help to establish the existence of some form of child abuse.'
California criminal courts allow an expert to identify certain physical
characteristics exhibited by a child and to opine that the child is suf-
fering from BCS.' s ' An expert, therefore, also should be able to iden-
tify psychological and emotional symptoms that are unique to children
who have been sexually abused and to opine that the child is suffer-
ing from CSAAS.' 8 2
Another syndrome, rape trauma syndrome (RTS), has been held
admissible only on a limited basis by California criminal courts.'83
RTS encompasses the typical reactions a rape victim experiences.' 84
RTS is an acute stress reaction that occurs after a rape in which the
victim is placed in a life threatening situation, experiences shock and
panic, and concentrates on staying alive.' 85 In contrast to the non-
violent crime of child sexual abuse,' 86 rape is generally a violent
177. Id. at 508, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 922. The jury normally has the responsibility of drawing
an inference of nonaccidental injury. Comment, Evidentiary Problems, supra note 5, at 272.
178. Comment, Expert Testimony on RTS, supra note 84, at 442.
179. Id. In dependency hearings (under Welfare & Institutions Code section 300) a finding
of BCS would establish a prima facie case of child abuse, and the burden of proof would
shift to the defendant. WELF. & INST. CODE §§355.1-355.6. No statute shifts the burden of
proof in criminal cases. Criminal courts have treated evidence of BCS, however, as sufficient
to convict the defendant. See, e.g., Ewing, 72 Cal. App. 3d at 716, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
180. BCS indicates that a child has received repeated serious injuries by nonaccidental means.
Jackson, 18 Cal. App. at 506, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 921. The behavior patterns exhibited by a
sexually abused child are unique to children who have been subjected to sexual abuse. Cheryl
H., 153 Cal. App. 3d at 1117, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 800-01. This behavior is relied upon by profes-
sionals as a manifestation of sexual abuse. See Summit, supra note 8, at 179.
181. See, e.g., Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d at 506-07, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 920-21; Phillips, 122
Cal. App. 3d at 87, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 714; Ewing, 72 Cal. App. 3d at 717, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 301.
182. See Cheryl H. 153 Cal. App. 3d at 1117, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 800-01 (court allowed
the introduction of evidence concerning CSAAS through an analogy of CSAAS and BCS).
183. See Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 247-48, 681 P.2d at 298-99, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 457-58 (RTS
may disabuse the jury of widely held misconceptions about rape and rape victims but may
not be used to show a rape actually occurred). The court in Roscoe narrowly interpreted Bledsoe
to prohibit expert witnesses from discussing the victim in the case at hand. Roscoe, 168 Cal.
App. 3d at 1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 50. Instead, the expert witness must confine any discussion
of RTS to victims as a class, supported by references to literature and experience. Id.
184. See generally, Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
981 (1974).
185. Kilpatrick, Veronen & Resick, The Aftermath of Rape: Recent Empicical Findings,
49 AM. J. ORTHoPsYcHIATRY 658, 659 (1979). See Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 242, 681 P.2d at
294, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 453.
186. See, supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
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crime. ' Therefore, the symptoms of RTS generally are distinctly dif-
ferent from CSAAS.' 88
Like child sexual abuse, adult rape is surrounded by pervasive myths
and stereotypes.' 89 RTS, like CSAAS, can help the trier of fact under-
stand the victim's behavior. The court in People v. Bledsoe'90 admitted
expert testimony on RTS for the purpose of rebutting misconceptions
about the presumed behavior of rape victims and, thus, increasing
the credibility of the victim. 19' By analogy, testimony regarding CSAAS
should also be admissible in criminal courts to dispel myths about
child sexual abuse and to increase the victim's credibility.
In Bledsoe, however, testimony concerning RTS was not admissi-
ble for the purpose of showing that the victim actually had been
raped. 19 Under current case law, if a defendant entertains a reasonable
and bona fide belief that the alleged victim consented to engage in
187. The crime of rape involves an act of sexual intercourse accomplished without the con-
sent of the victim. CAL. PENAL CODE §261. The use of force or fear of immediate and unlawful
bodily injury is one of the means by which the perpetrator overcomes the victim's will. CAL.
PENAL CODE §261(2). See, e.g., People v. Reeder, 152 Cal. App. 3d 900, 908, 200 Cal. Rptr.
479. 485 (1984) (defendant choked victim and told her he would kill her if she did not have
sex with him); People v. Mays, 17 Cal. App. 3d 641, 643, 95 Cal. Rptr. 190, 191 (1971) (defen-
dant rapist repeatedly hit victim about the face with his fist until victim stopped screaming).
188. RTS involves three phases. See generally Burgess & Holnstrom, supra note 184. First
is the "disorientation phase" which the victim experiences during the rape and in the hours
immediately following the rape. The victim may demonstrate one of two different styles in
this immediate impact reaction. In the first style, the victim is obviously agitated and acts
fearful and anxious. In the second style, the victim appears very controlled, feelings are masked,
and the victim may look very inappropriate for someone who has just been assaulted. The
second phase is the "reorganization phase," in which the victim begins to act as if everything
is normal. The victim is probably denying the experience to other people but still experiencing
very powerful feelings inside. The third phase is the "integration phase," in which the victim
suddenly becomes depressed and starts to relive the assault. This phase can occur months or
even a year after the sexual assault. At this stage, the victim must resolve feelings she has
about herself, the rapist, and the world in general. In addition, rape victims often experience
a fear response to all men and a phobia about being alone. Id.
189. See, Massaro, supra note 159, at 402.
The more common myths include: good women don't get raped; an unwilling woman
cannot be raped; all rape victims are attractive, young women; the victim provokes
the rape because she wants to be raped or because she puts herself in a dangerous
situation; women's sexual fantasies prove they enjoy rape ..
Id.
190. 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984).
191. Id. at 247-48, 681 P.2d at 298, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
192. Id. at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460. The Minnesota Supreme Court,
like the California Supreme Court in Bledsoe, held expert testimony on RTS inadmissible to
prove that a rape actually occurred. State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 231 (Minn. 1982).
The Minnesota court found that RTS was not a scientific indicator that can accurately and
reliably determine whether a rape has occurred. Id. The Minnesota court recognized, however,
that when the alleged victim of a sexual assault is a child or mentally retarded person, expert
testimony concerning credibility of a witness should be admitted. Id. In a later Minnesota case
involving the sexual abuse of a seven-year-old child, the court allowed expert testimony con-
cerning characteristics typically found in sexually abused children to bolster the victim's credi-
bility. Myers, 359 N.W.2d at 608-09. The expert testimony in Myers did not include an opinion
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sexual intercourse, no crime of rape has been committed.'93 The vic-
tim's state of mind is not determinative. A defendant may not be
guilty of rape even though the victim might believe in good faith that
she did not consent.19 ' The court determined that RTS was not
developed to discover the truth or accuracy of an alleged rape, but
rather the syndrome serves as a therapeutic tool to help identify,
predict, and treat emotional problems.' 95 The court in Bledsoe reasoned
that a woman could experience symptoms of RTS even though the
crime of rape has not been committed.' 9 6 The court also stated that
allowing an expert to testify that an alleged victim is suffering from
RTS unfairly prejudices the defendant.' 97 The prejudice arises because
the use of this scientific terminology might mislead the jury into in-
ferring that the expert believes the victim was actually raped.' 9 The
court held that even though RTS might be recognized generally by
the relevant scientific community, RTS is not relied upon to show
that a rape actually occurred and cannot be admitted into court for
that purpose.' 99
The rationale of the court in Bledsoe, however, does not apply to
a case involving CSAAS. CSAAS is used in the mental health field
to determine if sexual abuse has occurred. 200 The use of CSAAS is
not limited, like RTS, merely to the treatment of emotional prob-
lems.2"' Unlike RTS, therefore, CSAAS should be admissible to deter-
mine whether a child has been sexually abused. In addition, unlike
the rape of an adult, consent of the victim is not a defense to sexual
acts performed on a child. 2 2 Under the reasoning of the Bledsoe court,
therefore, CSAAS should be admissible to prove that a child was in
fact sexually molested. Unlike RTS, 20 3 evidence concerning CSAAS
that the child was sexually molested. The court, therefore, did not address the admissibility
of that opinion. However, the court said, "The reliability of expert opinion testimony with
regard to the existence or cause of the condition goes not to the admissibility of the testimony
but to its relative weight." Id. at 611. The court then stated that the defendant could attack
the expert testimony through cross-examination and the presentation of counter expert witnesses.
Id.
193. People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d 143, 155, 542 P.2d 1337, 1345, 125 Cal. Rptr. 745,
753 (1975).
194. Id.
195. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 249-50, 681 P.2d at 300-01, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459-60.
196. Id. at 250 n.12, 681 P.2d at 300 n.12, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459 n.12.
197. Id. at 251 n.14, 681 P.2d at 301 n.14, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459 n.14.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460.
200. See Summit, supra note 8, at 179.
201. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §288a(b)(2) (oral copulation with a person under 16);
Id. §286(b)(2) (sodomy with a person unddr 16).
203. See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text (testmony that victim suffers from RTS
unfairly prejudices the defendant).
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would not be unduly prejudicial to the defendant; the probative value
of CSAAS is much higher than that of RTS because of the eviden-
tiary problems involved in child sexual abuse cases.2" '
An analysis of BCS and RTS, both accepted by California criminal
courts, supports the admissibility of testimony regarding CSAAS.
Courts that have considered the admissibility of evidence concerning
CSAAS often have been guided by case law concerning other syn-
dromes. The first case involving admission of CSAAS by analogy to
other syndromes was In re Cheryl H.
IN RE CHERYL H.
The leading California case supporting the admissibility of CSAAS
is In re Cheryl H.20 5 In re Cheryl H. involved a juvenile dependency
hearing under Welfare & Institutions Code section 30006 upon allega-
tions that a father had molested his three-year-old-daughter, Cheryl.2 7
The court-appointed psychiatrist, who had conducted six therapy ses-
sions with Cheryl, testified that in her opinion Cheryl's conduct was
typical of conduct exhibited by other young sexually abused children.208
The psychiatrist concluded by stating her opinion that Cheryl had
been sexually molested. 2 9 Although the term syndrome was never men-
tioned, the doctor's testimony covered the symptoms of sexually abused
children, 21' and the admissibility of CSAAS is supported by the holding
of the court. Since the expert testimony was not viewed as describing
a syndrome or new scientific method of proof, the Kelly-Frye stan-
dard was not addressed.11
204. See supra notes 81-110 and accompanying text.
205. 153 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 200 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1984).
206. WELF. & INST. CODE §300. Section 300 provides in pertinent part:
Any person under the age of 18 years who comes within any of the following descrip-
tions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge such person
to be a dependent child of the court:
(d) whose home is an unfit place for him by reason of neglect, cruelty, depravity,
or physical abuse of either of his parents, or of his guardian or other person in
whose custody or care he is.
Id.
207. 153 Cal. App. 3d at 1108, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 794.
208. Id. at 1109-10, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
209. Id. at 1110, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
210. The conduct exhibited by Cheryl included: 1) sexually explicit play activity unusual
for a three-year-old; 2) going into a "disassociated state" when the subject of molestation
was broached; 3) recoiling when her father's name was mentioned; and 4) inventing new names
(i.e. "poopoo") for genitalia. Id.
211. The Kelly-Frye rule generally is not raised by the court if the expert testimony does
not describe the characteristics of sexually abused children as a syndrome. See supra note 132
and accompanying text.
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The court found that the doctor's testimony that Cheryl was sex-
ually abused was a proper subject for expert testimony under Evidence
Code section 801 because the subject of sexual abuse was sufficiently
beyond common experience that testimony would assist the trier of
fact. 212 The rationale of the court for the admissibility of the doc-
tor's testimony was based largely upon an analogy between the
characteristics of sexually abused children and BCS.21 3 The court
recognized the differences between medical testimony about physical
characteristics and psychiatric testimony about the victim's post-injury
behavior. 21 The differences were dismissed, however, with the asser-
tion that the victim's behavior appeared to be unique to children sub-
jected to sexual abuse. In addition, the court found that this behavior
was as valid an indicia of sexual abuse as the physical characteristics
used to diagnose BCS. 215 The court, however, prohibited any expert
opinion testimony that the father was the abuser or that the child
lacked the capacity to lie.2" 6
The court in In re Cheryl H. had no difficulty admitting expert
testimony concerning child sexual abuse. 7 Criminal courts, however,
appear to be uncertain as to how to deal with this type of testimony.
Case law on the admissibility of CSAAS in criminal proceedings is
inconsistent and unclear.
CSAAS IN CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL CASES
A. People v. Dunnahoo
People v. Dunnahoo,21' decided before Cheryl H., involved the sex-
ual abuse of two five-year-old girls by the man who was responsible
for the care of the children. 219 The court permitted two police officers,
qualified as experts in the field of child molestation, to bolster the
credibility of the victims by testifying that sexually molested children
have great difficulty talking to adults about sexual indiscretions.2 0
The girls' hesitant disclosure of the molestation fell under the fourth
element of CSAAS, delayed disclosure.22' The court, however, did
212. 153 Cal. App. 3d at 1116, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 800. See supra note 118 (Evidence Code
section 801 set forth in full).
213. 153 Cal. App. 3d at 1116-17, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
214. Id. at 1117, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1121-23, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 803-05.
217. Id. at 1116, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
218. 152 Cal. App. 3d 561, 199 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1984).
219. Id. at 567, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
220. Id. at 577, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
221. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
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not address CSAAS when discussing the admissibility of the testimony.
The evidence was held admissible under Evidence Code section 801.
The subject of child molestation, especially the sensitivities of the vic-
tims, was found to be knowledge sufficiently beyond common ex-
perience so that the opinion of an expert would help the trier of fact. 2
The court in Dunnahoo easily admitted evidence concerning child sexual
abuse by disposing of the issue of admissibility in one sentence.223
Obstacles to admissibility of this evidence in criminal courts has arisen,
however, when this evidence has been associated with the word "syn-
drome."
B. People v. Roscoe
People v. Roscoe2 1 was decided after Cheryl H. but resulted in
an inconsistent holding. Roscoe involved the molestation of a fifteen-
year-old boy by a neighbor with whom the boy had developed a rela-
tionship of trust and growing friendship. 25 The trial court allowed
a clinical psychologist, who had spent over fifteen sessions with the
victim, to give a diagnosis of the boy as a victim of child molesta-
tion.226 Although the sexual crime was committed without force or
violence against a child by a trusted adult and the victim exhibited
some of the elements of CSAAS,227 the appellate court chose to analyze
the doctor's testimony under the doctrine of RTS. 228 The court found
the expert's diagnosis of the boy as a victim of child molestation to
be inadmissible under Bledsoe.229 In addition, the court limited the
admissibility of RTS to credibility purposes by prohibiting any discus-
sion of the victim in the case at hand. 230
In a footnote, the court added that less strict rules of admissibility
apply when child abuse is an issue in noncriminal cases, such as
222. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 577, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
223. Id.
224. 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1985).
225. Id. at 1095, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
226. Id. at 1098, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
227. When the victim was first questioned by a police officer, he denied even knowing
the defendant. Later, he admitted knowing the defendant but denied any sexual contact. Finally,
he admitted some sexual contact but, due to shame and embarrassment, did not reveal the full
extent of the sexual exploits. Id. at 1096, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 47. The behavior of the victim
indicated two characteristics of CSAAS: delayed disclosure and inconsistent statements. See
supra notes 41-46 and 61-65 and accompanying text (discussion of secrecy and delayed disclosure).
228. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d at 1098, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 49. Although the expert witness
did not describe the victim's conduct as exemplifying RTS, the court stated that the reasoning
behind RTS "seems to apply to diagnosis as a victim of child molestation." Id.
229. Id. at 1100, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
230. Id.
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Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 dependency proceedings.23'
The footnote then acknowledged that in a Welfare and Institutions
Code section 300 case, an opinion .could be given that the particular
child had suffered abuse and cited Cheryl H.232
The holding in Cheryl H., however, was not limited expressly to
noncriminal cases. The court in Cheryl H. found that expert opinion
testimony that the victim was sexually abused was a proper subject
for expert testimony within the meaning of Evidence Code section
801.233 Section 801 applies to both criminal and civil cases."' The
court in Roscoe, however, indicated that a different standard for ad-
missibility of evidence applies to criminal and noncriminal cases."'
Thus, the Roscoe court implied that expert testimony concerning
CSAAS would not meet the standard for admissibility in a criminal
case even though the testimony met the prerequisites for admissibility
in a noncriminal case. 236
Criminal actions and dependency proceedings have different pur-
poses, but they raise similar constitutional concerns for protecting the
rights of the parties. 37 A criminal action is brought to punish viola-
tions of the law.238 Because a defendant's liberty can be denied, the
court must be careful not to violate the defendant's right to due pro-
cess.239 The ultimate concern in a juvenile dependency proceeding,
in contrast to criminal trials, is the best interests of the child rather
than the discipline of the abusive parent.2"' Juvenile courts, however,
have recognized the importance of safeguarding the right of parents
to have children and to retain custody of those children as one of
the liberties protected by due process.24' The court must be careful
not to encroach upon the due process right of parents and defen-
dants in both juvenile dependency proceedings and criminal actions,
231. Id. at 1100 n.4, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 50 n.4.
232. No other case was cited by the court. Id.
233. 153 Cal. App. 3d at 1116, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
234. California Evidence Code section 300 provides in pertinent part, "Exceptas otherwise
provided by statute, [the California Evidence Code] applies in every action before the Supreme
Court or a court of appeal, superior court, municipal court, or justice court. . . ." California
Evidence Code section 801 contains no language which limits the applicability of the section
in criminal or civil cases. See supra note 118 (text of California Evidence Code section 801
set forth in pertinent part).
235. 168 Cal. App. 3d at 1100 n.4, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 50 n.4.
236. See id.
237. See infra notes 242-45 and accompanying text.
238. Recommendations, supra note 38, at 10.
239. Id.
240. LE AL ISSUES AND APPRoAcHEs, supra note 3, at 6.
241. In re La Shonda B., 95 Cal. App. 3d 593, 599, 157 Cal. Rptr. 280, 283 (1979); Lois
R. v. Sup. Ct., 19 Cal. App. 3d 895, 901, 97 Cal. Rptr. 158, 1.63 (1971).
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respectively. Therefore, even though the purpose of a juvenile
dependency hearing is different from the purpose of a criminal trial,
the constitutional rights of the person accused of sexual abuse must
still be protected by the court when evidence is admitted against the
accused.
Although lower standards of admissibility exist for certain types
of evidence in juvenile hearings,2"2 courts have required proof that
a minor is a dependent child of the court to be established by evidence
that is legally admissible in civil trials.24 The statutory phrase "legally
admissible in civil trials" only refers to evidence admissible in a civil
case without the additional statutes governing the admission of evidence
in juvenile proceedings. 44
The California Evidence Code applies equally in both criminal and
civil cases unless the Code expressly states otherwise.24 Evidence Code
section 801 has been utilized extensively by the courts in both criminal
and civil cases. 2 6 The holding of Cheryl H. that expert testimony
diagnosing a victim as sexually abused was a proper subject for expert
testimony under Evidence Code section 801247 should apply to expert
testimony in criminal as well as noncriminal cases. In addition, the
court in Dunnahoo has stated that evidence concerning the subject
of child molestation is admissible under Evidence Code section 801.
The most recent California criminal case to address the admissibility
of CSAAS has agreed with Dunnahoo.
C. People v. Payan
In People v. Payan,248 the court admitted expert testimony on
CSAAS. Both CSAAS and RTS, however, were discussed inter-
242. See, e.g., CAL. WEtL. & INST. CODE §281 (juvenile court authorized to receive and
consider the reports and recommendations of the probation officer in determining any matter
involving the custody, status, or welfare of a minor); Id. §355 (for purposes of determining
whether the minor is a person described by section 300, any matter or information relevant
and material to the circumstances may be received by the juvenile court as an exception to
the hearsay rule).
243. Id. §355. Section 355 provides that proof by a preponderance of evidence, legally ad-
missible in the trial of civil cases, must be adduced to support a finding that the minor is
a person described by section 300. Id. See Amanda I., 166 Cal. App. 3d at 259, 212 Cal.
Rptr. at 325 (1985).
244. Amanda L, 166 Cal. App. at 259, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
245. For example, California Evidence Code section 801 has been applied equally in criminal
and noncriminal cases. See infra note 246 and accompanying text.
246. See, e.g., Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d at 506-07, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 920-21 (criminal case
in which expert gave opinion testimony that child suffered from BCS); Neumann v. Bishop,
59 Cal. App. 3d 451, 463, 130 Cal. Rptr. 786, 794 (1976) (civil case in which physician gave
expert opinion testimony concerning plaintiff's present condition of health).
247. 153 Cal. App. 3d at 1116, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
248. 173 Cal. App. 3d 27, 220 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1985), modified, 174 Cal. App. 3d 73b.
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changeably by the court, and the rationale supporting the holding
is unclear. Payan involved a defendant charged with the sexual molesta-
tion of three small girls, including the defendant's own daughter."4 9
A doctor, who qualified as an expert on child sexual abuse, testified
concerning the elements of CSAAS and offered an opinion, based
upon a review of police and medical reports and preliminary hearing
transcripts, that the three children had been sexually abused. 5 The
trial court instructed the jury that the expert witness did not per-
sonally interview the childen, that her opinion was based solely upon
the records she reviewed, and that the jury ultimately must determine
whether the assumed facts were supported by the evidence. 25'
Although the court admitted both the testimony about the elements
of CSAAS and the opinion that the children were sexually abused,
the holding was limited. The court stated that sexual abuse of children,
especially children of the age in the case,252 was a proper subject for
expert testimony to help the jury understand a child victim's behavior
and the significance of any medical findings. 2 3 Therefore, the court
limited the admissibility of CSAAS to the purpose of increasing
credibility. The reasoning in support of this narrow holding is unclear
and provides very few guidelines for trial courts to follow in deter-
mining whether to admit or exclude CSAAS.
The court of appeal in Payan stated that the issue before the court
was whether testimony concerning sexually abused children is admissi-
ble.25 In addition, the court clearly differentiated between the pur-
poses behind CSAAS and RTS.2 ss The court, however, equated CSAAS
249. Id. at 31-32, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
250. Id. at 33-34, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
251. Id. at 33, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
252. Id. at 40, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
The children involved in this case were four, four, and seven years of age at the time of
the sexual assaults. Id. at 31-32, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 127. Sexual abuse of young children creates
greater evidentiary problems for prosecutors, and thus the need for the admission of CSAAS
is greater than if the abuse involves an older child. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
The symptoms of CSAAS, however, can be experienced by both older and younger children.
See, e.g., Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d at 1095, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 47 (fifteen-year-old child exhibited
symptoms of CSAAS); Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d at 1108-10, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 794-95
(three-year-old child displayed symptoms of CSAAS). A discussion of the cut-off age at which
CSAAS is no longer admissible is beyond the scope of this comment. This comment proposes;
however, that the age of the child should be merely one factor to consider by a court in deter-
mining the probative value of CSAAS.
253. 173 Cal. App. 3d at 40, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
254. For example, the court stated, "We believe there are important factors in favor of
admitting expert testimony on the issue of sexual abuse in children." Id. at 37, 220 Cal. Rptr.
at 131.
255. The court noted that CSAAS was used to clinically diagnose sexually abused children,
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with RTS256 and analyzed the current law on RTS. 7
The court drew a comparison between the case at bar and Roscoe,
in which expert testimony on RTS had been disallowed.2"8 Instead
of distinguishing the two cases on the basis that Roscoe involved RTS,
the court focused on the fact that in Roscoe the expert had coun-
selled the victim, while in Payan the expert had not had any therapeutic
contact with the victims.259 The Payan court emphasized that the expert
was not a therapist under a professional duty to help the victim. 60
Under the logic of the court, any duty to help the victim would pre-
vent the therapist from forming an objective opinion of whether the
victim was sexually assaulted.26' The court concluded by stating that
a trial court might refuse to admit the testimony of an expert witness
whose only contact with an alleged victim was in a therapeutic set-
ting. 262 This statement ignores the previous differentiation by the court
between the purposes of RTS and CSAAS. 263 RTS was not developed
to determine the truth of an allegation of rape.264 Courts, therefore,
have not allowed a therapist who has counselled the victim to testify
that the victim suffered from RTS. In contrast to RTS, CSAAS was
developed to help professionals determine whether a child had been
sexually abused. 265 Any therapeutic contact between the expert and
the abused child, therefore, logically would help the expert in diagnos-
ing the child as sexually abused. Therapeutic contact between the ex-
pert and the child should be viewed by courts as a positive factor
in the admission of testimony about CSAAS. 2
66
The court in Payan looked to Roscoe, a case involving the ad-
missibility of RTS, for the correct scope of admissibility for CSAAS.
267
rather than being used merely as a "therapeutic tool." Id. at 34, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 129. In
Bledsoe, the court rejected expert testimony that a complaining witness was suffering from
RTS primarily because the syndrome was developed as a "therapeutic tool" to treat patients
and not to accurately diagnose rape victims. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 249-50, 681 P.2d at 300-01,
203 Cal. Rptr. 459-60.
256. While several symptoms overlap, rape and child sexual abuse involve very different
factors, and CSAAS should not be confused with RTS. See supra notes 30-78 and accompany-
ing text (discussion of CSAAS); supra notes 183-188 and accompanying text (discussion of RTS).
257. See Payan, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 34-37, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 128-31 (discussion of RTS).
258. Id. at 36, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
259. Id. at 36, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
260. See id.
261. Id.
262. See id. at 40, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
263. See id. at 34, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 129; see supra note 255 and accompanying text.
264. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 249-50, 681 P.2d at 300-01, 203 Cal. Rptr. 459-60.
265. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
266. Cf. Hall v. State, 692 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Ark. App. 1985) (defendant objected to expert
testimony regarding child sexual abuse on the basis that the testimony should be confined to
the specific case at hand rather than to generalities).
267. The Payan court, quoting Roscoe, stated,
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Although the Payan court admitted expert opinion testimony that the
children were sexually abused, this decision was based upon the careful
admonishments given to the jury by the trial court. 268 The appellate
court stated in dicta that the better practice might be to restrict the
expert's testimony to a discussion of victims as a class and to pro-
hibit any opinions on whether the prosecuting witness was in fact
molested.269
By applying the judicial standards of admissibility for RTS to
CSAAS, the Payan court overlooked the important distinguishing
factors of each syndrome. While at first glance RTS and CSAAS ap-
pear similar because both syndromes deal with sexual assault, the two
actually are quite different2 0 and should not be treated interchangeably.
CSAAS AND ScoPE OF ADMIssmrTY
The evidentiary problems in child sexual abuse cases often thwart
the successful prosecution of legitimate charges of sexual abuse.27'
Expert testimony concerning CSAAS, however, should not be admissi-
ble in every case involving child sexual abuse. CSAAS represents the
common characteristics of children who have been sexually abused
by a relative or other trusted adult.272 Children who are violently at-
tacked by strangers might exhibit some of the symptoms of CSAAS.273
A violent attack, however, usually leaves physical evidence of the sexual
assault.274 In addition, the child victim of a sexual assault by a stranger
does not encounter the familial pressures not to testify or to recant
[E]xpert testimony authorized by Bledsoe to permit rehabilitation of a complainant's
credibility is limited to a discussion of victims as a class, supported by a reference
to literature and experience (such as an expert normally relies upon) and does not
extend to discussion and diagnosis of the witness in the case at hand.
Payan, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 36, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
268. See supra note 251 and accompanying text (jury instructions given by the court).
269. Payan, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 40, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
270. See supra notes 39-71 and accompanying text (discussion of the elements of CSAAS);
see supra note 188 and accompanying text (discussion of RTS symptoms).
271. See supra notes 81-114 and accompanying text.
272. See Summit, supra note 8, at 180.
273. For example, delayed disclosure is common in both rape and child sexual abuse cases.
Delia S. v. Torres, 134 Cal. App. 3d 471, 476, 184 Cal. Rptr. 787, 790 (1982) (victim told
no one of the rape for almost two months because she was ashamed, humiliated, and fright-
ened); see supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text (discussion of delayed disclosure in child
sexual abuse cases).
274. See, e.g., Frank, 38 Cal. 3d at 719, 700 P.2d at 417, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 803 (physical
evidence of violent sexual attack on two-year-old child included the following: the child's nipples
had been pinched and partially pulled away from her body, the entrance to her vagina was
torn and the hymen broken, her vaginal area contained sperm, her anus exhibited evidence
of trauma indicating that a foreign object had been inserted there).
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the accusation of sexual abuse.275 Thus, the need for expert testimony
concerning CSAAS is much less in a violent than in a nonviolent
assault. Expert testimony on CSAAS should be limited to cases in
which the victim has been sexually abused by a relative or other trusted
adult in a nonviolent manner. 76
Evidence concerning CSAAS should be admissible in criminal courts
for two purposes: to bolster the credibility of the victim and to prove
that a victim was sexually molested. The trier of fact may have cer-
tain erroneous expectations regarding the behavior of sexually abused
children. 7 Expert testimony concerning the typical characteristics of
sexually abused children will eliminate these erroneous expectations
and provide the trier of fact with the necessary background to analyze
the credibility of the child victim.27 The courts in Cheryl H., a non-
criminal case, and Payan, a criminal case, both have held that expert
testimony on CSAAS is admissible to bolster the credibility of the
victim by helping the jury to understand the behavior of a child vic-
tim.279
In addition, the court in Cheryl H. held that expert testimony con-
cerning CSAAS was properly admissible to prove that sexual abuse
actually occurred.28 0 This purpose should be a permissible basis for
the introduction of CSAAS in criminal, as well as noncriminal, cases.'
As in Cheryl H. the court in Payan permitted expert testimony on
CSAAS to establish that sexual abuse had occurred. 8 2 Admissibility
for this reason, however, was based upon the particular circumstances
in the case. 285 The Payan court in dicta limited the introduction of
expert testimony concerning CSAAS to credibility purposes only.2"4
The rationale of the court, however, was based upon case law con-
275. Legal Issues and Approaches, supra note 3, at 4. See supra notes 66-71 and accompa-
nying text.
276. Courts have applied RTS to cases that involve child rape by a stranger. See, e.g.,
Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (14-year-old girl raped).
277. See supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
278. Summit, supra note 8, at 177.
279. Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d at 1116, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 799-800; Payan, 173 Cal.
App. at 40, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
280. Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d at 1116, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 799-800.
281. See supra notes 233-47 and accompanying text.
282. 113 Cal. App. 3d at 31-32, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
283. The court stated, "Although the better practice might be to . . . forbid opinion on
whether the prosecuting witness was in fact molested, we find no error in the instant case
because of the careful admonishments given by the trial court." Id. at 40, 220 Cal. Rptr.
at 133. See supra note 251 and accompanying text (discussion of jury instructions given by
the trial court).
284. 173 Cal. App. 3d at 40, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
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cerning RTS.2 s CSAAS, however, is distinguishable from RTSY86 The
rationale for excluding expert testimony concerning RTS as proof of
rape is inapplicable to cases involving child sexual abuse.
28 7
In addition, evidence of BCS has been held admissible by Califor-
nia criminal courts as proof that a child was physically abused. 288
Although the physical injuries that characterize BCS are more readily
identifiable than the psychological factors that comprise CSAAS, both
BCS and CSAAS set forth unique identifying characteristics for dif-
ferent forms of child abuse. 9
The court in Cheryl H. concluded that the behavior shown by a
sexually abused child was as valid an indicia of abuse as the physical
characteristics used to diagnose BCS.2 19 A medical diagnosis is based
on probability, and the lack of scientific certainty does not deprive
a medical opinion of evidentiary value.29 ' By analogy to BCS, expert
testimony concerning CSAAS should be admissible in criminal courts
as proof that a child was sexually abused.
CONCLUSION
The nature of child sexual abuse creates many impediments to the
detection and prosecution of criminal cases. Prosecutors often are con-
fronted with the evidentiary problems of a lack of corroborative
evidence and a victim who is unwilling or unable to testify. Expert
testimony concerning CSAAS will help alleviate these problems and
will provide valuable and necessary information to enable the trier
of fact to judge credibility and to determine if sexual abuse has
occurred.
California courts have determined that child sexual abuse is a proper
subject for expert testimony under California Evidence Code section
801. In addition, although CSAAS is a relatively recent concept, the
syndrome has sufficient support in the area of child abuse to establish
reliability under the Kelly-Frye standard. In cases riddled with eviden-
tiary problems, expert testimony concerning CSAAS contains great
probative value and is not unduly prejudicial to the defendant. The
285. See id. at 36-37, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 130-31.
286. See supra notes 39-71 and accompanying text (discussion of CSAAS); supra note 188
and accompanying text (discussion of RTS).
287. See supra notes 192-204 and accompanying text.
288. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919. See supra note 174 and accompany-
ing text (symptoms of BCS).
289. See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
290. Cheryl H., 153 Cal. App. 3d at 1117, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
291. Id.
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evidentiary problems associated with the prosecution of child sexual
abuse create strong policy arguments for the admissibility of CSAAS.
The high probative value of CSAAS necessitates the admissibility of
expert testimony, especially when other evidence of the abuse is scarce.
In addition, analogies to similar syndromes admissible in California
criminal courts support the admissibility of CSAAS. CSAAS should
be admissible to bolster the victim's credibility and to prove that a
victim was sexually molested. Expert testimony concerning CSAAS
will contribute to a greater number of successful prosecutions of child
molesters without encroaching upon the rights of defendants.
Kathy L. Hensley
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